Haily for Security Reviewers
What your security team will want to check before your organization uses Haily: how it meets each category of the OWASP Top 10, what independent testing has found, and how to tell us about a vulnerability.
The OWASP Top 10:2025 is the Open Worldwide Application Security Project's list of the most critical risks to web applications. Each section below names a category, links to OWASP's own description of it, and says how every Haily app meets it today: Haily Admin, Haily Finance, Gringotts and Haily's websites.
The OWASP Top 10:2025
A01: Broken Access Control
- Every request is checked: each route says who may use it (signed in, an organization's Admin, the account's owner), and each record is looked up for the person asking, so no one reaches another person's account, conversation or file.
- Changes come only from the app: every change needs the app's own header or a token tied to the session, on top of SameSite=Strict cookies.
- Apps stay apart: the calls between Haily's apps never leave the server they run on, and an app may ask only about its own part of a person's account.
- No requests on anyone's behalf: no server fetches an address a person supplies.
A02: Security Misconfiguration
- Strict headers on every site: HTTP Strict Transport Security for each domain and its subdomains, a Content Security Policy that never lets a page be framed, a Permissions-Policy turning off the camera, microphone and location, and no server banner.
- Servers reachable only through HTTPS: each app listens on the server's own loopback address, behind the web server, as an account of its own that can't log in.
- Nothing for development in production: no debug mode, no interactive API documentation and no test tools.
A03: Software Supply Chain Failures
- Exact versions: every server installs the exact package versions its tests ran against, and every web app builds from a lockfile.
- Known vulnerabilities stop a release: each deploy checks every package against published advisories (pip-audit and npm audit) and stops if one is affected.
- Only reviewed code ships: a deploy refuses to run with uncommitted changes, and Haily's shared pieces ship only as committed.
A04: Cryptographic Failures
- Encrypted in transit: HTTPS only, everywhere, with post-quantum key exchange (X25519 with ML-KEM-768, FIPS 203) for every client that offers it, and legacy TLS (RSA key exchange, 3DES, SHA-1) turned off.
- Encrypted at rest: every conversation with Haily is sealed with AES-256-GCM, keys of its own for each app and interface, held in Google Secret Manager and loaded into memory only.
- Secrets never stored plain: sessions are kept only as SHA-256 hashes, and passcodes as keyed HMAC-SHA256.
A05: Injection
- Parameterized queries: every database query passes its values as parameters, never as joined text.
- Haily's own lookups read only: when Haily queries financial data, it uses a read-only connection that refuses anything but reading, limited in time and rows.
- Words are words: everything shown is escaped, every value sent between apps is encoded, and each page runs only its own scripts, named by their SHA-256.
A06: Insecure Design
- Built so the operator can't misuse it: no view, route or tool lets anyone running Haily read a person's conversations, act as them, or see an organization's people. Haily's own Super Admin sees organizations by name and counts alone.
- Haily proposes, people decide: Haily never acts on money or settings itself; a person approves each change, and the change is checked again before it's made.
- Limits by design: spending caps, rate limits on sign-in and feedback, and a person who prepares a journal can never approve it.
A07: Authentication Failures
- No passwords: Google Sign-In only, each token checked against the app's own client, and only verified addresses accepted.
- Sessions that end: every session ends on the server after a set time, ends at sign-out, and ends when an account is deleted.
- Tries are limited: sign-in and passcode attempts are limited per address.
A08: Software or Data Integrity Failures
- Releases never change: a published version can't be replaced with different contents.
- Checked by fingerprint: each release's SHA-256 is recorded when it's published, and Haily's updates are refused if what arrives doesn't match.
- No untrusted data deserialized: nothing a person sends is unpickled or evaluated.
A09: Security Logging and Alerting Failures
- Every Admin change kept: what an organization's Admins change is recorded with who and when, for its Admins to see; trading actions and journal decisions keep full histories.
- Outages raise alerts: every Haily app and site is checked every five minutes, and one that stops answering alerts the team.
- Logs keep no secrets: access logs, which would hold addresses and query strings, are off; conversations are never logged.
A10: Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions
- Failing closed: an app that can't load its encryption key won't start rather than store a conversation plain; sign-in waits rather than guess when it can't be checked; nothing is deleted when an app can't be reached.
- No internals shown: errors say what happened in plain words, never a stack trace or a server's error.
- Every outside call has a time limit, so one slow service never holds the rest.
Penetration Tests
No independent penetration test of Haily has been done yet. When one is, its full report will be published here, with every finding and how each was fixed.
Report a Vulnerability
If you find a vulnerability in any Haily app or site, write to chris@moba11y.com. Please give us a chance to fix it before telling anyone else; we'll reply, keep you posted, and credit you if you'd like. Haily's security.txt says the same for security tools.
Last updated November 16, 2026.